Legal Ethics: Confidentiality and the Case of Robert Garrow\u27s Lawyers by Chamberlain, Jeffrey Frank
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 25 Number 1 Article 8 
10-1-1975 
Legal Ethics: Confidentiality and the Case of Robert Garrow's 
Lawyers 
Jeffrey Frank Chamberlain 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey F. Chamberlain, Legal Ethics: Confidentiality and the Case of Robert Garrow's Lawyers, 25 Buff. L. 
Rev. 211 (1975). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol25/iss1/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
LEGAL ETHICS: CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE CASE OF
ROBERT GARROW'S LAWYERS*
Slayer's 2 Lawyers Kept Secret of 2 More Killings
Lake Pleasant, N. Y., June 19 [1974]--Two lawyers for a man on
trial here for murder did not disclose for six months that they had
seen the bodies of two other people killed by their client because, they
said, they were bound by the confidentiality of a lawyer-client rela-
tionship.
The court-appointed attorneys said today that their client had
told them where to find the bodies of two missing women. They photo-
graphed the bodies, they said, but did not report the discoveries to
authorities searching for the murder victims.
The lawyers also said they had kept their discovery from the father
of one of the women, who had visited them in the hope that they
could shed some light on the disappearance of his 20-year-old daugh-
ter.
"The information was so privileged-I was bound by my lawyers'
oath to keep it confidential after I found the bodies;" said Francis
Belge, one of the two lawyers representing Robert Garrow. Mr. Car-
row, a 38-year-old mechanic for a Syracuse bakery, is accused of fatally
stabbing Philip Domblewski, an 18-year-old Schenectady student who
was camping in the Adirondacks last July.**
In the United States, the right to practice law is conferred by the
state.' "Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened by conditions,"2
* A primary document cited throughout this Comment is "The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility," promulgated by the American Bar Association in August, 1969.
ABA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1974)
[hereinafter cited as the CODE]. This document was adopted by the New York State
Bar Association as its own code of ethics, effective January 1, 1970. N. Y. JUDICIARY
LAW, Appendix (McKinney Supp. 1970). The CODE consists of a Preamble [hereinafter
so cited], Canons [hereinafter so cited], Ethical Considerations [hereinafter cited as
"EC," followed by identifying number], and Disciplinary Rules [hereinafter cited as
'DR," followed by identifying number]. Former Canons of ethics [hereinafter cited as
"Former Canon" followed by identifying number], are cited repeatedly in the annota-
tions to the present CODE, and may be found in H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 309-25
(1953). Interpretations of the CODE by the American Bar Association Committee on Pro-
fessional Responsibility are known as Formal and Informal Opinions [hereinafter so
-cited]. Opinions are collected in ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS
(1967). (Some informal opinions are not bound; they are collected in loose-leaf, by
-chronological order).
** N. Y. Times, June 20, 1974, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.).
1. See Rules of the New York State Bd. of Law Examiners, N.Y.C.R.R. § 6000
(1973); cf. In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); New York
County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 54 Misc. 2d 564, 282 N.Y.S.2d 985, aff'd in part,
modified in part on other grounds, 28 App. Div. 2d 161, 282 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1st Dep't
1967); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw §§ 90, 53, 467 (McKinney 1968); N.Y. Cry. PR c. LAw
art. 94 (McKinney 1963). See also N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 460 (McKinney 1968).
2. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84, 116 N.E. 782, 783, cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661
<1917). See also Kraushaar v. LaVin, 181 Misc. 508, 42 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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one of which is that a lawyer's primary duty lies to the institutions and
procedures which comprise the legal system.8 A lawyer is called an
"officer of the court ' 4 and is, as such, "an instrument or agency to ad-
vance the ends of justice." 5 The lawyer's fidelity to the ends of justice
involves two professional responsibilities. On the one hand, he owes
the duty of "good faith and honorable dealing to the judicial tribunals
before whom he practices his profession."6 On the other, he is an advo-
cate on behalf of his client, to whose interests he owes "entire devo-
tion.' 7 This dual loyalty may at times result in tension, for "while the
attorney owes a duty to the law to see that justice is done, his role in
the adversary system requires service to his client which at times bor-
ders on the obstruction of justice."'8
One such service is the lawyer's duty to preserve the confidences
and secrets of his clients.9 Clients traditionally have expected their law-
yers to hold their personal affairs in strictest confidence, and almost all
attorneys recognize an obligation to be discreet about their clients'
business. However, the rules of confidentiality are not merely cus-
tomary; they are justified in history, and by reasons intimately con-
nected with and essential to the adversary system of law.10 The ad-
versary process stands upon the premise that the systematic attainment
3. See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928); cf. In re
Kelly, 243 F. 696, 705 (D. Mont. 1917).
4. People ex tel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928);
see Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1886); Bowles v. United States, 50
F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1931); People v. Gorman, 346 Il. 432, 444, 178 N.E. 880,
885 (1931).
5. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928).
N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(2) (McKinney 1968) holds that an attorney may be cen-
sured, suspended, or disbarred for "any conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice."
6. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 553, 574, 27 N.E. 1096, 1103
(1891).
7. Former Canon 15. See also Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 232, 246-48
(1850). An attorney owes "total devotion" to the interests of his client. EC 2-33; see
State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 234, 140 A.2d 863,
870 (1958); Laughlin v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 163 S.W.2d 761, 765-66 (Mo. 1942);
In re Thomasson's Estate, 346 Mo. 911, 918, 144 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940).
8. Note, Professional Responsibility and In re Ryder: Can an Attorney Serve Two
Masters?, 54 VA. L. Rnv. 145, 147 (1968).
9. It is "undoubtedly the law that a communication by a party to his attorney
to aid him in conducting .. . litigation is privileged." LeLong v. Siebrecht, 196 App.
Div. 74, 76, 187 N.Y.S. 150, 151-52 (2d Dep't 1921); see King v. Ashley, 179 N.Y. 281,
72 N.E. 106 (1904); Williams v. Fitch, 18 N.Y. 546, 551 (1859); In re Eno, 196 App.
Div. 131, 187 N.Y.S. 756 (1st Dep't 1921).
10. In our legal system, the role of the lawyer as partisan advocate appears, not
as a "regrettable necessity," but as an "indispensable part of a larger ordering of affairs."
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1161
(1958). See also Randall, Our Professional Responsibility: Lawyers Make Freedom a
Living Thing, 43 A.B.A.J. 315 (1957).
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of justice is best accomplished by having the arguments and facts on
each side of a justiciable controversy investigated and presented with
maximum zeal by opposing counsel, for decision by the court and
jury." For the system to operate properly, it is necessary that an advo-
cate have "all the facts."' 2 Thus, it is thought to be necessary that a
client be free to consult his attorney without apprehension of disclosure
of his gecrets by the attorney.' 3 The general rule is that "A [1]awyer
[s]hould [p]reserve the [c]onfidences and [s]ecrets of a [c]lient.' 4
Lawyer-client confidentiality began as an evidentiary privilege,
the history of which is well known.' 5 In Roman times, a slave was
incompetent to bear witness against his master. 6 Cicero, when prose-
cuting the Roman governor of Sicily, regretted that he could not sum-
mon the latter's patronus, Hortensius, 7 and the matter received statu-
tory regulation in the Acilian law on bribery of 123 B. C.' s By the
fourth century, advocates and attorneys were completely incompetent
as witnesses in cases in which they were involved.' 9 In England, by
the time of Elizabeth I, the evidentiary privilege against disclosure
11.
Our legal system provides for the adjudication of disputes governed
by the rules of substantive, evidentiary, and procedural law. An adversary
presentation counters the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in
terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known; the advocate, by his
zealous preparation and presentation of facts and law, enables the tribunal to
come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind and to render impartial
judgments.
EC 7-19. See also H. DRINKrER, LEGAL ETHICS 76 (1953); Formal Opinion 23 (1930);
Randall, supra note 10, at 1160-61.
12. "The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the
confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts
essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early
legal assistance." EC 4-1 (emphasis added).
13. "That all such confidential communications between an attorney and his client
are privileged from disclosure has been upheld by the Courts from a very early period
in the ... administration of justice." United States v. Funk, 84 F. Supp. 967, 968 (E.D.
Ky. 1949) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855,
863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); see Blackburn v. Crawfords, 70 U.S.
175, 192-94 (1865).
14. Canon 4.
15. See Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y. 72 (1881); Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394 (1880);
Flight v. Robinson, 8 Beav. 22, 36 (Ch. 1844) ; 1 S. PHILLIPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF EvmENcE 134 (1868).
16. See generally W. BUTCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 623, 662 (1921).
17. Cic. in Verr., Act ii, 8, 24.
18. A. GREENREDGE, THE LEGAL PROCEDURE OF CICERO'S TIME 484 (1971). The
Lex Acilia is in most Roman source books, and is translated in HARDY, ROMAN LAws
AND CHARTERS 10-24 (1912).
19. See Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928).
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of confidential information by attorneys appears to have been unques-
tioned.20
According to Wigmore,21 the original exclusion inured solely to
the attorney, as a "point of honor." This doctrine was accepted until
the last quarter of the eighteenth century,2 when a new theory, which
"looked to the necessity of providing subjectively for the client's free-
dom of apprehension in consulting his legal advisor, '23 sought to re-
move the risk of disclosure by the attorney even at the hands of the
law.24 Under the original theory, the privilege did not protect the client
himself, for the "'point of honor' was not his to make." 25 Further-
more, under the original theory the protection of the lawyer was as to
information received relevant to the litigation at bar only, and "[w]hen
the cause is ended, [the attorney] is then only to be considered with
respect to his former employer, as one man to another; and then the
breach of trust does not fall within the jurisdiction of [a] court ....,21
Finally, under the original theory, the privilege could be waived by the
attorney, since "the Court can't determine what is honour. 27 On the
other hand, under the modern theory, the evidentiary privilege inures
strictly to the client,2 and may not be ignored except under a waiver
granted by the client.29 Furthermore, under the modern theory, the
20. See, e.g., Kelway v. Kelway, 21 Eng. Rep. 47 (Ch. 1580), in which examina-
tion of plaintiffs attorney was limited to matters "which shall not be touching the
secrecy of the title, or of any other matter, which he knoweth as soliciter only." Id. See
also Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577), in which a soliciter was exempted
from examination touching the cause. See generally 8 J. WIOMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CosI]eON LAW § 2290 (3d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
21. WIGMORE, supra note 20, at 543.
22. Id. § 2286 at 531.
23. Id. § 2290 at 543, § 2291.
24. As will be demonstrated, infra, the ethical duty against disclosure may be
thought to embody portions of the earlier doctrine.
25. WIGMORE, supra note 20, at 544.
26. Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1139, 1240 (Ex. 1743).
27. Id.; accord, Bishop of Winchester v. Fournier, 2 Ves. Sr. 445, 447, 28 Eng.
Rep. 284, 285 (Oh. 1752).
28. Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826); Schwinmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); Abbott
v. Supreme Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 19, 177 P.2d 317 (1947); Hunter v. Kenney, 77
N.M. 336, 422 P.2d 623 (1967); accord, WIGMORE, supra note 20, at §§ 2321, 2323.
29. "Unless the client waives the privilege . . . ." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4503 (a)
(McKinney 1963); see Lanza v. Joint Legislative Comm., 3 N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d 772,
164 N.Y.S.2d 9, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957); Beach v. Oil Transfer Corp., 23
Misc. 2d 47, 199 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Mileski v. Locker, 14 Misc. 2d 252, 178
N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Castiglione v. State, 8 Misc. 2d 932, 934, 169 N.Y.S.2d
145, 147 (Ct. Cl. 1957). A communication which is privileged when made remains
privileged forever, unless waived by the client. Mileski v. Locker, supra at 255; Yordan
v. Hess, 13 Johns. 492 (Sup. Ct. 1816). However, if the privilege is waived, the attorney
[Vol. 25
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scope of the privilege extends beyond communications actually made
with respect to a pending suit, and now covers almost all communica-
tions between a lawyer and his client.30
A distinctive facet of the modem evidentiary privilege is that
it protects confidential communications from involuntary-but not
voluntary-disclosure by an attorney.31 It operates to prevent forced
disclosure before any tribunal having the power to compel testimony,32
and only before such tribunal.33 In addition to courts of law, the privi-
lege prevents disclosure when the lawyer is called as a witness by a
grand jury,34 an administrative agency,3 5 or a legislative committee.3 6
Thus, the privilege may be asserted only after an attorney is called to
testify-or to produce documents of a confidential nature.3 7 "In other
words, it forbids ,the disclosure of such evidence by an attorney ...
when examined as a witness."38 An attorney may not invoke the evi-
dentiary privilege to justify non-disclosure unless disclosure was re-
may be compelled to disclose. See Pye v. Hoehn, 31 Misc. 2d 712, 221 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup.
Ct. 1961).
30. N.Y. Civ. PREc. LAw § 4503(a) (McKinney 1963); UNIFORm RULE OF
EVIDENCE 26; see, e.g., Lanza v. Joint Legislative Comm., 3 N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d
772, 164 N.Y.S.2d 9, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957); In re Williams' Estate, 179
Misc. 805, 39 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sur. Ct 1942). See generally MCCORMICK, A. TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE 9-100 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; WIGMORF, supra
note 20, at §§ 2290-2329.
31. "As a rule of evidence, the lawyer-client privilege . . . operates only when the
attorney is under compulsion to give testimony or produce evidence." Note, The Lawyer-
Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, The Role of Ethics, and Its Possible
Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 235, 249 (1961) (emphasis added).
32. See WIGMORE, supra note 20, at §§ 2252, 2291-92.
33. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 833, 394 P.2d 681,
684 (1964).
34. Ex parte Enzor, 270 Ala. 254, 117 So. 2d 361 (1960); State v. Schroeder, 112
So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1959).
35. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); In re Richardson, 31 N.J.
391, 157 A.2d 695 (1960).
36. United States v. Keeney, 111 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Gibson v. Legislative Investigation Comm'n,
108 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1958).
37. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
833 (1956), involved a grand jury's investigation of tax evasions, during which it had
attempted to subpoena the records of an attorney, who refused to surrender them and
was held in contempt.
38. Lanza v. Joint Legislative Comm., 3 N.Y.2d 92, 97, 143 N.E.2d 772, 774, 164
N.Y.S.2d 9, 12 (1957). The privilege also extends to protect the client from being
compelled to reveal information communicated by him to his lawyer in confidence.
"Neither the client nor the counsel may be compelled.., to produce a document which
has the status of a privileged communication .... ." Bloodgood v. Lynch, 293 N.Y. 308,
314, 56 N.E.2d 718, 721 (1944). See also Rieser Co. v. Loew's Inc., 194 Misc. 119, 81
N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Bolt & Co. v. Gilmore, 120 Misc. 116, 198 N.Y.S. 616
(Sup. Ct. 1923). The privilege also operates to protect confidential communications
from the lawyer to the client. Buckley v. Vidal, 50 F.R.D. 271, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1975]
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quested in an official proceeding.3 9 But likewise, there can be no viola-
tion by an attorney of the evidentiary privilege unless a disclosure (or
non-disclosure) claimed as violative occurred in the course of an official
proceeding.
However, in addition to this privilege, there is an ethical duty to
keep a client's secrets.40 The evidentiary privilege would be futile, and
its purpose of inducing full disclosure by the client largely thwarted,
if the attorney were free to make voluntary, out-of-court disclosures
of professional confidences against the client's will.4 ' The ethical duty
is thus necessary to effectuate the policies of confidentiality.
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client
and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation
by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or
sought to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever
he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to ob-
tain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer
should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling
in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal
system .... The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to
hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facili-
tates the full development of facts essential to proper representation
of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance. 42
While the policies behind the ethical prohibition against disclosure
are closely connected to those justifying the evidentiary privilege, the
Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly notes the distinction be-
tween the two:
39. When there is no evidentiary privilege, for whatever reasons, any attempt to
employ it to suppress evidence will be culpable. Note, supra note 8, at 150.
40. Canon 4 reads: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a
Client."
41. Historically, as the legal system increased in complexity and lawycring became
more and more a profession, there was perceived a need for uniform regulation of
members of the bar. In the Preamble to the CANONS OF ETHICS OF THE N w YORK
STATE BAR AssocIATiON (1949), it is noted that "it is peculiarly essential that the
system for establishing and dispensing Justice be developed to a high point of efficiency
and so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and im-
partiality of its administration." Id. at 2. There is no direct support for the ethical duty
in the common law, although it may be thought to have been affirmed indirectly since
an attorney may be held liable in tort for abusing his client's confidences. Cf. In re
Boone, 83 F. 944 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897); Taylor v. Blacklow, 132 Eng. Rep. 401 (C.P.
1836). Similar to the evidentiary privilege, its ultimate justification is its vitality to the
accusatorial process. The ethical duty thereby furthers the discovery of truth in legal
proceedings. The duty is enforced by disciplinary actions brought under the Con. See,
e.g., United States v. Costen, 38 F. 24 (C.C. Colo. 1889); In re Abuza, 178 App. Div.




The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical
obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his
client. This ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists
without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact that
others share the knowledge. A lawyer should endeavor to act in a
manner which preserves the evidentiary privilege; for example, he
should avoid professional discussions in the presence of persons to
whom the privilege does not extend.43
The ethical duty thus is broader than the evidentiary privilege, its pro-
hibition against disclosure applying to situations not covered by the
latter rule.44 For example, while the evidentiary privilege prohibits
disclosure of confidential information obtained from the client,45 the
ethical duty requires non-disclosure of all facts learned by a lawyer "by
reason of his confidential relationship,"46 and "without regard to the
nature and source of the information."47 There need be no act of
communication,4" nor is it necessary that the facts be transmitted to the
attorney by the client or the client's agent.49 Under the evidentiary
rule, information revealed by the client to the attorney while in the
presence of a third party is not privileged;5 0 the ethical duty requires
silence "without regard to . . . the fact that others share the knowl-
43. EC 4-4.
44. Therefore, a violation of the evidentiary rule would lead to two disciplinary
proceedings, one evidentiary and the other ethical. But a violation of the ethical precept
might be wholly unrelated to the evidentiary rule and hence subject the offender only
to an ethical proceeding.
45. "To be protected as a privileged communication, information or objects
acquired by an attorney must have been communicated or delivered to him by the client,
and not merely obtained by the attorney while acting in that capacity for the client."
Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 831, 394 P.2d 681, 683 (1964); see Dupree v.
Better Way, Inc., 86 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1956). See also 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 283
(1957); 58 Am. JUR. Witnesses § 492 (1948).
46. Formal Opinion 163, at 434 (1936).
47. Formal Opinion 23, at 99 (1930). For a discussion of the extent of the
privilege, see WIGBORE, supra note 20, at §§ 2317-20; 26 MINN. L. REv. 744 (1942); 88
U. PA. L. REv. 467 (1940); 1943 Wis. L. REV. 424. The ethical duty protects
much of the "work product" of an attorney. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Information may also be protected under an analogous state discovery rule. See generally
Note, Discovery: Work Product and Good Cause Development Since "Hickman v.
Taylor," 36 IND. L. J. 186 (1961); Note, Discovery: Hickman v. Taylor, A Decade
Later, 37 N.D.L. Rv. 67 (1961). Indeed, it is not essential that a lawyer-client re-
lationship be established for the canons to operate-the mere possibility of such a re-
lationship suffices. Formal Opinion 287 (1953); Formal Opinion 216 (1941).
48. See Formal Opinion 163 (1936).
49. See Formal Opinion 23 (1930).
50. 58 Am. JUR. Witnesses § 492 (1948); see e.g., In re Estate of Krup, 173
Misc. 578, 18 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Kings County Ct. 1940). This assumes that the third




edge.""' The evidentiary privilege prohibits disclosure only when an
attorney is faced with official compulsion to disclose; the ethical duty
extends to out-of-court, voluntary indisecretions.52
In most circumstances, this professional duty is accepted as axio-
matic by lawyers and laymen alike. Yet even in its most general form
the very existence of such a duty has not been immune from attack,
usually on the ground that the protection of communications between
lawyer and client may lead to guilty parties avoiding rightful punish-
ment. Jeremy Bentham suggested that lawyer-client confidentiality
should be abolished, since it was not needed by an innocent party with
a "righteous cause or defence," and since a guilty party should not be
given its aid in concerting a false one.53 While this criticism presupposes
absolutes of guilt or innocence, such absolutes being rare indeed in legal
affairs, 4 its thrust runs deeper: Does not the existence of the right to
confidentiality allow the suppression of evidence highly relevant to-
or even determinative of-a fair decision about the respective rights
of persons involved in a legal controversy? The answer is affirmative:
the rules against disclosure of confidential communications represent
deliberate tolerance of the suppression of some pertinent information,
on the ground that the protection of confidentiality is vital to the
accusatorial process.5 5 As Bentham suggested, it is possible that rightful
punishment (or liability) could, in particular instances, be avoided solely
because of non-disclosure of confidential information. But this result is
acknowledged and accepted under the rules against disclosure; the
policy of the rules is to foster lawyer-client confidentiality in general,
not in particular:5 6
To the furnishing of [expert legal] advice the fullest freedom and
51. EC 4-4.
52. "Both social amenities and professional duty should cause a lawyer to shun in-
discreet conversations concerning his clients." EC 4-2.
53. J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, bk. IX, pt. IV, ch. V, § 2, in
VII THE WORKS OF JEREmY BENTHAM (J. Bowring ed. 1838-43).
, 54. Bentham's arguments are cited at length in WIOMORE, supra note 20, § 2291,
at 549-51. Wigmore's detailed refutations follow directly. Id. at 552-54.
55. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass.
1950); WIGmORE, supra note 20, at § 2291.
56.
To be sure the exercise of the [rules of confidentiality] may at times result in
concealing the truth and in allowing the guilty to escape. That is an evil,
however, which is considered to be outweighed by the benefit which results
to the administration of justice generally.
People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden, 150 Misc. 714, 717, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 367 (Sup. Ct.
1934). "The individual interest outweighs the public concern in the search for truth."
State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 415, 129 A.2d 417, 425 (1957). See also McCoRMIcx,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 91 (1954); Randall, supra note 10.
[Vol. 25
LEGAL ETHICS
honesty of communication of pertinent facts is a prerequsite. To
induce clients to make such communications, the [rules prohibiting
disclosure are] said by courts and commentators to be... necess[ities].
The social good derived from the proper performance of the functions
of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm
that may come from the suppression of the evidence in specific cases.57
It is thought that the potential harm which may result from the rules
of confidentiality is a fair price to pay for the generally beneficial func-
tioning of the legal system as a whole.
Yet the possibility of abuse is problematic, for what of the lawyer's
obligation, as an "officer of the court," to be candid and fair in his
dealings with courts and other lawyers?5" The recognition of a prohibi-
tion against the disclosure of the secrets of a client, and the recognition
of the essential importance of such a prohibition to the legal system as
a whole, does not mean that the prohibition against disclosure is with-
out conditions or exceptions. "The social policy that will prevail in
many situations may run foul in others of a different social policy, com-
peting for supremacy. ' 59 A balancing of social interests is always diffi-
cult, and there can be no set of hard-and-fast rules to cover all circum-
stances. "In fulfilling his professional responsibilities, a lawyer neces-
sarily assumes various roles that require the performance of many
difficult tasks. Not every situation which he may encounter can be
foreseen .... -60 Some specific situations call for very close decisions by
attorneys on the limits of confidentiality.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: 6' A client informs
his attorney that he is guilty of killing a police officer who was acting
57. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 210, comment a (1942) (emphasis added).
58. Former Canon 22 states that "[tihe conduct of the lawyer before the Court and
with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness." See, e.g., In re
Glover, 176 Minn. 619, 223 N.W. 921 (1929) (per curiam); In re Marron, 22 N.M. 252,
160 P. 391 (1916); In re Abrams, 36 Ohio App. 384, 173 N.E. 312 (1930); In re Mc-
Cullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939). A lawyer appearing in a pending case must
also "advise the court of decisions adverse to his client's contentions that are known
to him and unknown to his adversary." Formal Opinion 146, at 415 (1935). See also
Note, The Attorney's Duties of Disclosure, 31 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 283, 291-93 (1957).
59. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1932).
60. Preamble. See also Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference,
supra note 10:
No general statement of the responsibilities of the legal profession can
encompass all the situations in which the lawyer may be placed. Each position
held by him makes its own peculiar demands. These demands the lawyer must
clarify for himself in the light of the particular role in which he serves.
rd. at 1218.
61. Credit and appreciation must be acknowledged to Professor Adolf Homburger,
State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, for the
creation and development of this hypothetical situation.
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in the line of duty. He also informs the attorney that he had been
called to testify at a preliminary inquiry into the homicide, that in the
course of the hearing he perjured himself, and that as a result he is no
longer suspected of the murder. On this set of facts, most lawyers would
have little difficulty justifying their refusal to turn in their client
to the authorities at this point. Suppose, however, that a short time later
the attorney learns that another person, if fact innocent of the slaying,
has been convicted of the murder of the police officer and is about to be
executed for the crime. If the attorney now tells authorities of his
client's guilt, he has violated the confidentiality of the lawyer-client
relationship. Yet if he does not, an innocent person will lose his life.
If the lawyer violates his client's confidence, he may be, technically,
subject to a disciplinary proceeding which might lead to disbarment.
If he does not, justice will be thwarted. The dilemma is theoretically
unsolvable. Of course, as a practical matter, many lawyers would feel
compelled by their consciences to prevent the execution of an innocent
person, and the profession which would discipline an attorney for
such behavior is a profession to which many lawyers would not wish to
belong. Yet the theoretical problem remains, and in hard cases the line
of ethical behavior is extremely thin. One such case has recently become
quite well known. Does the confidentiality of a lawyer-client relation-
ship justify the actions of Robert Garrow's lawyers?
In July, 1974, a jury convicted Robert Garrow of the murder of
Philip Domblewski. Six months earlier, Frank Armani and Francis
Belge, Garrow's court-appointed attorneys, had seen the bodies of two
other people killed by their client. They had not disclosed this in-
formation because, they said, they were bound by the confidentiality
of the lawyer-client relationship.
According to press reports, Garrow had told the attorneys where
to find the bodies of two missing women. Acting upon information
supplied to them by Garrow, Mr. Armani and Mr. Belge, on their own,
went out, searched for, and eventually located the bodies. With "crude
diagrams of the Mineville area" supplied by Garrow to Mr. Belge, the
two attorneys visited the area five times. After extensive searching, they
found the body of Susan Petz in a mineshaft. Mr. Armani lowered Mr.
Belge by his feet into the mineshaft, and Mr. Belge took pictures of the
Petz body.6 2 The body of Alicia Haucks was discovered by Mr. Beige
62. Herald Journal (Syracuse), June 19, 1974, at 42, col. 3. The attorneys subse-
quently destroyed the diagrams and pictures. The trial transcript of June 17, 1974, con-
tains this entry:
Beige: "If the court please, I took almost six days of tape recordings of the De-
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in a Syracuse cemetery. "Garrow couldn't give us a diagram of that one,
just a general description. I found the body by squaring off the area
with markers." 63
The attorneys finally revealed the locations of the bodies after
Garrow had blurted out in court during his trial for the Domblewski
murder that he had been involved in other slayings. At this point, Mr.
Armani and Mr. Belge apparently felt that their client had waived his
right to confidentiality by implicating himself in the other killings.6
fendant while he was in the Champlain Valley Hospital in Plattsburgh, New
York. I did take and make diagrams and maps and so did Mr. Armani and we
did-I did-I took photographs of the bodies-and because they were so
privileged, that is I was so bound under my lawer's oath to keep them con-
fidential after I discovered the bodies, despite the fact that I wanted to and Mr.
Armani wanted to inform the parents about the bodies, we destroyed them."
Id. at 42.
63. Herald Journal (Syracuse), June 19, 1974, at 42, col. 4.
64. It should be noted that neither Mr. Armani nor Mr. Belge were ever re-
quested to reveal their information by any official tribunal. Mr. Armani was asked as to
the whereabouts of the missing women by the District Attorney of Onondaga County,
at a wake. He was asked by the New York State Police on several occasions, one of
which occurred when the police visited Mr. Armani at his offices. The father of Ms.
Hauck also requested information. None of these, or any other, requests occurred in
any official proceeding.
A great outcry followed the lawyers' revelations. "Citizens," said Onondaga County
District Attorney Jon Holcombe, "are in an absolute rage here." L. A. Times, July 2,
1974, § 1, at 1, col. 1. William Hauck, father of one of the slain women, is quoted as
saying, "It's hard to believe that they [the attorneys] were acting as officers of the
court. The least they could have done was make an anonymous phone call to the po-
lice." Post Standard (Syracuse), June 20, 1974, at 2, col. 1. The mother of Ms. Petz,
upon learning of the lawyers' actions, exclaimed, "Oh my God . . . oh my God ...
isn't that illegal? I can't imagine anyone living with such a thing; it must be illegal."
Times Union (Albany), June 20, 1974, at 7, col. 1. The Times Union noted in an edi-
torial that "[e]thical conduct by legal representatives is a tenet of our form of justice.
In this case, it's impossible to imagine that many people-particularly the parents of
the slain girls-would consider that justice has been served." Id., June 21, 1974, at 11,
col. 3. The most virulent public criticism was in letters-to-the-editors columns. Letter
writers expressed "revulsion and abhorrence," "utter disbelief," and "disgust." Herald
Journal (Syracuse), July 2, 1974, at 3, col. 4. One writer said that "[ilf this is the lawyer's
Code of Ethics to put parents through hell then, it's about time it be changed." Id.
Another saw the incident as "another deplorable example of behavior by members of
this so-called profession." Id. Mr. Armani and Mr. Belge were also publicly chastised
by members of the "so-called" profession. One defense lawyer, who asked that his name
not be published, stated that the withholding of the information was "unconscionable"
and that the lawyers "ought to be censured." Times Union (Albany), June 20, 1974, at
7, col. 2. A "leading Minneapolis attorney," again preferring to remain anonymous, was
more outspoken: "It's outrageous. They should both be put in jail." L. A. Times, July
2, 1974, § 1, at 15, col. 1.
Mr. Armani summed up the adverse reaction to his and his associate's conduct in
this passage from an unpublished address to the Illinois Bar Association, delivered on
October 31, 1974:
I want to emphasize that my associate, Mr. Belge and I took [the lawyer's
oath] and that to us an oath is a very sacred thing. In retrospect however, when
we took this oath neither of us had the slightest idea of the awesome conse-
quences it would someday carry. The taking of this oath and our attempt to
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Before Garrow's confession, and the subsequent disclosure by Mr.
Armani and Mr. Belge, the lawyers had withheld two pieces of informa-
tion. The first was Garrow's admission to them that he had committed
two other homicides. The second was the exact whereabouts of the
bodies of these two other victims, which Mr. Armani and Mr. Beige
had discovered by independent investigation.
With respect to the independent investigation, it is somewhat mys-
terious why the attorneys chose to do so at all; what such an investiga-
tion added to their defense, either as a matter of substance or of
strategy, is unclear. The question important here, however, is not this,
but whether such an independent investigation, as differentiated from
a direct communication, affected the ethical positions of Mr. Armani
and Mr. Belge. It is suggested that it did not, on the grounds that an
independent investigation, albeit mysterious in purpose, is allowable
behavior for an advocate.
A defense counsel in a criminal case is under an affirmative duty
to investigate the facts of the matter.65 This obligation extends to in-
vestigating the defendant's version of the facts, 6 and the "duty to in-
vestigate exists regardless of the accused's statements to the lawyer of
facts constituting guilt."67 If an attorney does not fulfill this duty to
live up to it has caused us and our families much anguish and pain ....
There have been acts of vandalism committed against our properties; we have
received threats of death . . .; our families have been subjected to obscene
telephone calls and we have been made to appear by certain news media in a
very unfavorable light-I recall one editorial that said that we made the Water-
gate conspirators look like 'Sunday School Picnickers.'
However, not all reaction was adverse. James Carter, President of the Albany
County Bar Association, declared "there was no ethical and no legal way they [Mr.
Armani and Mr. Beige] could have revealed this confidential information, heinous as
it may have been." Times Union (Albany), June 20, 1974, at 7, col. 1, and "Albany
County District Attorney Ralph Smith Jr., agreed that the lawyers had 'no legal obliga-
tion' to reveal the whereabouts of the bodies, and 'probably had a legal obligation not
to do so,' although he said that the situation 'offends me personally. It's a horrible
thing.'" Id. Monroe Freedman, Dean of Hofstra Law School, expressed his opinion that
the "conduct of the lawyers is absolutely correct. If they had acted otherwise, it would
have been a serious violation of their professional responsibility." TizeE, July 1, 1974, at
68. Warren Wolfson, a Chicago defense attorney, was more blunt: "If lawyers become
stool pigeons and informers," he said, "our system of justice is down the drain." L. A.
Times, July 2, 1974, § 1, at 15, col. 8.
With considerable understatement, Associated Press noted that the lawyers' ac-
tions have "focused public attention on the issue of lawyers' ethics." See Watertown
Daily Times, Sept. 13, 1,974, at 11, col. 8. Tom Goldstein, in a column for the New
York Times, described the area of lawyer-client confidentiality as "increasingly murky."
N.Y. Times, June 23, 1974, § 4, at 9, col. 1.
65. See, e.g., Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579, 588 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
66. Kott v. Green, 303 F. Supp. 821, 823 (N.D. Ohio 1968) ; Abraham v. State, 228
Ind. 171, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950).
67. A. B. A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATINO
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investigate, he may be cited for providing ineffective assistance.68 Fur-
thermore, if an attorney does not make a sufficient investigation, a con-
viction may be set aside on a minimum standard of prejudice. 69 In
McLaughlin v. Royster,70 the standard suggested is whether an ade-
quate factual investigation would have enabled counsel to cast reason-.
able doubt on the government's evidence, or to create a defense. Gar-
row's lawyers had pleaded a defense of insanity, and the confessions
they obtained from their client in open court were presumably part
of an attempt to show Garrow's psychological instability. Perhaps Mr.
Armani and Mr. Belge felt that this ploy would have been less effective
had the events to which Garrow testified not been true, and that the
only way to have been sure of the veracity of the testimony was to in-,
vestigate the facts for themselves.7 1
There is no suggestion that either attorney attempted to hide either
body in any way. The New York Times quotes Mr. Armani as saying,
"I categorically state that I never arranged any bodies or touched any
bodies."7 2 And although Mr. Belge is alleged to have touched the body
of Ms. Haucks,73 there is no suggestion that he attempted to conceal it
in any way. This distinguishes the Garrow situation from the situation
which precipitated the well-known case of In re Ryder.74 In that case,
an attorney (Ryder) had represented a client suspected in a bank rob-
bery. He had transferred what reasonably appeared to be stolen money!
and a shortgun used in the crime from his client's safety deposit box
to his own.75 The District Court of Virginia suspended Ryder for
TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4.1 (approved draft
1970), commentary at 226-28.
68. Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (4th Cir. 1962).
69. See generally Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. Q. 1077.
(1973).
70. 346 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972).
71. An analogy may make this point more clear. An attorney is under an obliga-
tion to try to prevent a client from giving perjured testimony. To prevent perjured
testimony, a lawyer must at the outset know what is true. A client likely to perjure him-
self is also likely to lie to his lawyer. Therefore, to attempt to prevent his client from
committing the fraud of perjury on the court, the attorney must independently investi-
gate to determine to the best of his ability the true state of affairs in the situation.
72. July 4, 1974, at 23, col. 3.
73. In a memorandum of law submitted April 26, 1975, in the case of People v.
Beige, Indictment No. 75-55, Index No. 75/123 (Onondaga County Court, N.Y., filed
Feb. 13, 1975), Mr. Beige states that "[t]he Grand Jury .. .heard . . . that the de-
fendant [Mr. Belge], after the discovery of the body [of Ms. Hauck] . . .since the body
was separated because of some varmints or animals, took the skull of the deceased and
placed it next to the rest of the remains." Id. at 6.
74. 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967). For an excellent discussion of lawyer-client
confidentiality in general, and In re Ryder in particular, see Note, 54 VA. L. REv. 145
(1968).
75. 263 F. Supp. at 363.
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eighteen months.7 6 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that "[flit is
an abuse of a lawyer's professional responsibility knowingly to take pos-
session of and secrete the fruits and instrumentalities of a crime. '77
But what if Ryder had just gone to his client's safety deposit box and
looked at the contents to be sure his client was telling the truth? The
court notes that "[i]t was Ryder, not his client, who took the initiative
in transferring the incriminating possession [sic] of the stolen money
and shotgun .... Ryder's conduct went far beyond the receipt and
retention of a confidential communication from his client."78 But it is
not the fact that the attorney took affirmative action upon which the
case turns. The fact that an attorneys acts on his own is not per se un-
ethical, and it is many times required. In Ryder's case, it was the type
and content of his action which violated Ryder's professional responsi-
bilities.79
While it is true that not all information is protected by the rules
of confidentiality,8 0 with respect to the question whether the knowledge
of the locations of the bodies was protected against disclosure there
appears to be nothing peculiar about this type of information which
would exempt it from the operation of the rules.8 " In State v. Sulli-
van,82 the Washington Supreme Court spoke directly to the issue. That
case was an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty on the charge that Mrs.
Irene Sullivan had murdered her husband. 3 At the trial, Mrs. Sullivan's
attorney was called as a state witness, and testified that he had told au-
76. Id. at 370.
77. 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (emphasis added).
78. 263 F. Supp. 360, 365 (E.D. Va. 1967).
79. It has been noted that the ethical duty protects the confidentiality of all facts
learned by a lawyer "by reason of his confidential relationship" and "without regard to
the nature and source of the information." Notes 46-47 supra & accompanying text.
Nor is it material that the information here withheld by Mr. Armani and Mr. Beige was
not directly connected to the specific subject-matter of their representation of Garrow:
So long as the mere possibility of a lawyer-client relationship exists (see note 47 supra)
it is not essential to the protection of confidences of a client that the client's remarks be
relevant to the advice sought. Formal Opinions 287 (1953) & 274 (1946). Sec also
WIGasORE, supra note 20, at § 2302; UNIFORix RULE OF EVmENCE 26(3) (c) (evidenti-
ary privilege). There is no question that a lawyer-client relationship existed between
Garrow and his attorneys.
80. For example, "[a] lawyer may reveal ... [t]he intention of his client to com-
mit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime." DR 4-101 (C) (3); see
Formal Opinion 314 (1965).
81. It is suggested as incontrovertible that disclosure of this information "would be
likely to be detrimental to the client." DR 4-101 (A). Moreover, an attorney is forbid-
den to disclose information obtained by him from his client when such information could
be the basis for another suit against the client. In re Williams' Estate, 179 Misc. 805, 39
N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sur. Ct. 1942).




thorities where the body of Mr. Sullivan was buried."" The court held
that this testimony violated Washington's statute defining lawyer-client
privilege, 5 and that the testimony was prejudicial enough to warrant
reversal of the conviction.8 6 There is an obvious distinction between
Sullivan and the Garrow case, for in Sullivan the behavior cited was
not the disclosure itself but subsequent testimony about that disclo-
sure. But the court is clear about just what information was protected
by lawyer-client confidentiality: it was "that defendant had told de-
fense counsel where she had buried her husband's remains."87 A more
important distinction is that the stated ground for reversal in Sullivan
was not disclosure, but prejudice.
The prosecuting attorney could have had only one intent and
purpose when he called defense counsel as a state witness: to prejudice
the jury by giving it an opportunity to draw the inescapable inference
that defendant had told defense counsel where she had buried her
husband's remains. This was privileged under the statute, and it was
prejudicial error to force [the attorney] to testify concerning it.8
But again, the court was clear on just what was protected, and explicitly
expressed its unconcern that the attorney had not testified directly to
the content of communications with his client:
We believe it immaterial that the lawyer, when called upon to
testify, was questioned concerning what he told others, but was not
questioned concerning the confidential communication of his client to
him. If the former must be obviously based upon the latter, the client's
privilege prohibits the attorney from testifying.89
If information is confidential, it is unethical for an attorney to divulge
it. It would compound the error to allow an attorney who has already
disclosed his client's secrets then to testify to them in court. And it
would be absurd to contend that a "limitation" of such testimony to
what the attorney had already divulged would make any difference
84. Id. at 217, 373 P.2d at 475.
85. Id. WAsir. RV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(2) (Supp. 1974) provides in part:
"An attorney or counselor shall not, without the consent of his client, be examined as
to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of professional employment." In New York, the parallel statute reads in part:
"Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney . . .shall not disclose, or be allowed
to disclose such communication .... " N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4503(a) (McKinney
1963).
86. 60 Wash. 2d at 226, 373 P.2d at 481.
87. 60 Wash. 2d at 218, 373 P.2d at 476.
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis in original).
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whatever to the plight of a client whose rights to confidentiality have
been violated. Finally, it is obvious that had there been no right of
confidentiality, there could have been no prejudice from the disclo-
sure. Clearly, a revelation by a client to his lawyers concerning the
whereabouts of his victims' remains is the kind of information encom-
passed by the rules of confidentiality.
But a further question arises: Subdivision (1) of section 4200 of
the New York State Public Health Law provides that "[e]xcept in the
cases in which a right to dissect it is expressly conferred by law, every
body of a deceased person within this state shall, be decently buried or
incinerated within a reasonable time after death."90 This section was
transferred to the Public Health Law from section 2211 of the former
New York Penal Law of 1909. 91 An "historical comment" to section
4200 states that "[a] violation or interference with these rights con-
tinues to be a misdemeanor," and the matter receives statutory regu-
lation in section 12(b) of the Public Health Law: "A person who wil-
fully violates any provision of this chapter . . . is punishable by im-
prisonment not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars or by both." 2 Accordingly, a willful and intentional
act of secreting bodies, or of permitting bodies to remain concealed, in-
volves a direct and continuing interference with the rights of interment,
and in New York, such interference is a class "A" misdemeanor. 93 Fur-
thermore, Public Health Law, section 4143, in essence, requires that
anyone knowing of the death of a person without medical attendance,
shall report the same to the proper authorities. 4 Under the provisions
of Public Health Law, section 12(b), 95 a deliberate violation of this sec-
tion is also a class "A" misdemeanor.9 6 A charge that Mr. Armani and
Mr. Belge violated or interfered with the rights of burial, and that they
failed to give proper notice of a death, appears different from a charge
that they failed to disclose a conversation wherein their client admitted
committing a crime. Thus, the question presented is whether or not
90. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4200 (McKinney 1971).
91. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4200 (McKinney 1971).
92. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 12-b(2) (McKinney 1971).
93. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 55.10(2) (b) (McKinney 1975).
94. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4143 (McKinney 1971) reads, in relevant part:
Deaths without medical attendance; registration
1. In case of any death occurring without medical attendance, it shall
be the duty of the funeral director, undertaker, or any other person to whose
knowledge the death may come, to give notice of such death to the coroner
of the county, or if there be more than one, to a coroner having jurisdiction, or to
the medical examiner.
95. See note 92 supra.
96. See note 93 supra.
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an attorney may be insulated by the Code from the consequences of
committing a crime-whether a duty of confidentiality is a sufficient de-
fense for a lawyer accused of violating the law. %:
The question may be answered in the affirmative. The privileges
and duties of confidentiality often operate to exempt from revelation
facts which an attorney otherwise would be expected to disclose. "The.
privileged communication may be a shield or defense as to crimes."
97
The well-known Washington case of State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell9s
provides helpful insight. In that case, an attorney was cited for con-
tempt for his refusal to comply with a demand and a subpoena duces
tecum that he produce at a coroner's inquest a knife allegedly in his
possession but belonging to his client. The client was a suspect in
connection with the stabbing death of another man. The attorney re-
lied on the lawyer-client privilege for his refusal to comply with the
subpoena or to give any testimony as to whether the knife was in his
possession. The appellate court ruled that the knife in the attorney's
possession was protected by the lawyer-client privilege if the securing
of the knife by the attorney was the direct result of information com-
municated to the attorney by the client. The court found that the
knife had in fact been secured as a result of such communication, and
it therefore held that the attorney's refusal to testify at the inquest was
not contemptuous. 9
In Washington, as in most jurisdictions, it is a crime intentionally
to "delay or hinder the administration of the law" by failing to pro-
duce material evidence which has been "properly" demanded. 00 In
the absence of a privilege against disclosure of confidential communi-
cations, failure to comply with a subpoena duces tecum would not only
be contemptuous, 101 but might also involve an attorney in the crime of
obstruction of justice. Thus, because of the existence of lawyer-client
confidentiality, the attorney in Olwell was insulated from the conse-
quences of actions which otherwise would have been criminal. 102
97. Gebhardt v. United Ry., 220 S.W. 677, 679 (Mo. 1920).
98. 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964).
99. Id.
100. WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.69.070 (1961). See also WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.69.060
(1961), relating to the obstruction of justice for the refusal to reveal material informa-
tion. In New York, the analogous statutes are N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney
1970) (tampering with physical evidence); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 195.05 (McKinney
1970) (obstructing governmental administration); and, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 205.50 (Mc,
Kinney 1970) (hindering prosecution).
101. WASH. REv. CODE § 36.24.050 (1963).
102. See also Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 159 F. Supp.
917 (D.N.J. 1958), in which lawyer-client confidentiality barred discovery under FED.
R. Civ. P. 34.
1975]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In view of this, what, then, is the meaning of Disciplinary Rule
4-101()(2), which reads, "[a] lawyer may reveal: [c]onfidences . . .
when... required by law or court order"?10 3 Clearly, a subpoena duces
tecum is a court order which embodies a requirement of law, and yet,
just as clearly the Olwell court allowed an attorney to disregard it. The
solution offered by the Washington court is not very helpful: "On
the basis of the attorney-client privilege, the subpoena duces tecum
issued by the coroner is defective on its face because it requires the at-
torney to give testimony concerning information received by him from
his client in the course of their conferences." 10 4 Thus, the attorney did
not run foul of DR 4-101(C)(2) by withholding evidence he was required
by law to produce; since the evidence was privileged, the subpoena de-
manding it was "defective on its face" and hence lacked the force of
law. But this does not solve the problem. The only significant distinc-
tion between this "defective" subpoena and any other one is that here
the evidence sought was protected by lawyer-client confidentiality. To
say that a demand for information or evidence protected by lawyer-
client confidentiality is not a lawful demand does not answer the ques-
tion, it avoids it.
Subsequently, despite its finding that the evidence was protected
by lawyer-client confidentiality, the court articulated the principle that
the protection afforded by the privilege was not without limitation:
We do not, however, by so holding, mean to imply that evidence
can be permanently withheld by the attorney under the claim of the
attorney-client privilege. Here, we must consider the balancing process
between the attorney-client privilege and the public interest in crim-
inal investigation. We are in agreement that the attorney-client
privilege is applicable to the knife held by appellant, but do not agree
that the privilege warrants the attorney, as an officer of the court, from
withholding it after being properly requested to produce the same.
The attorney should not be a depository for criminal evidence (such
as a knife, other weapons, stolen property, etc.), which in itself has
little, if any, material value for the purposes of aiding counsel in the
preparation of the defense of his client's case. Such evidence given the
attorney during legal consultation for information purposes and used
by the attorney in preparing the defense of his client's case, whether
or not the case ever goes to trial, could clearly be withheld for a
103. See also DR 7-102(A) (3), which provides that "a lawyer shall not conceal
or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal," and EC 7-27,
which provides that "because it interferes with the proper administration of justice, a
lawyer should not suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal."
With regard to the permissive nature of DR 4-101 () (2), as indicated by the use
of the word "may," see note 113 infra.
104. 394 P.2d 681, 684 (Wash. 1964).
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reasonable period of time. It follows that the attorney, tfter a reason-
able period, should, as an officer of the court, on his own motion turn
the same over to the prosecution.10 5
It is apparent here that the court was referring to the evidentiary
privilege only; it neglected to consider the ethical duty. Absent a
waiver by the client, the ethical duty prohibits disclosure of confidential
information forever.10 6 Furthermore, the court's holding that possession
of the knife was privileged, but that the privilege did not warrant
the attorney, "as an officer of the court, from withholding it after being
properly requested to produce the same," is, if read literally, either
question-begging or nonsense. If the court uses "properly" to indicate
a situation in which an attorney must reveal his information or turn
over his evidence, then the question of privilege has been avoided, for
the statement means simply that unprivileged information is not priv-
ileged.1 0 7 Moreover, in such a case the statement is superfluous. For if
an attorney has a duty to reveal his evidence, the duty exists from the
time the lawyer acquires the evidence, and he should not wait until
"after" he has been requested to produce, or until the expiration of a
"reasonable time." On the other hand, if "properly" means that a
procedurally correct demand for information or evidence has been
made (i.e., that a subpoena duces tecum was drawn and served with
due regard for the legal requirements of such a document), then the
court's holding that such a request or demand abrogates the privilege is
nonsense, for it is exactly this sort of protection that is the essence of
the evidentiary protection for confidential communications. 1 8 If the
question posed is whether lawyer-client confidentiality may protect
from disclosure information or evidence otherwise required by law
or court-order to be disclosed, then the answer is that in many cases
it does. If it did not, there would be no such thing as lawyer-client
confidentiality.0 9 On this interpretation, DR 4-101(C)(2) is either in-
105. Id. (emphasis supplied).
106. Milesld v. Locker, 14 Misc. 2d 252, 178 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Yorden v. Hess, 13 Johns. 492 (Sup. Ct. 1816).
107. Similarly, the court's holding that subpoena was "defective" if it demanded
confidential information meant merely that privileged information is privileged.
108.
An attorney has the duty to protect the interests of his client. He has a right
to press legitimate arguments and to protest an erroneous ruling.
Gallagher v. Municipal Court, 31 Cal. 2d 784, 796, 192 P.2d 905, 913 (1948). "There
must be protection, however, in the far more frequent case of the attorney who stands
on his rights and combats the order in good faith and without disrespect believing with
good cause that it is void, for it is here that the independence of the bar becomes valu-
able." Note, 39 COLUm. L. Rv. 433, 438 (1939).
109. See generally Note, 46 YAE L. J. 703 (1937).
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consistent with the entire notion of lawyer-client confidentiality (since
it would undercut the very basis of the rules), meaningless (if the pro-
tection of confidentiality may be asserted in the face of a court order
or requirement of law on the ground that no such order or legal re-
quirement can be considered "lawful" if it requests confidential in-
formation), or superfluous (if it states merely that when disclosure
is required, disclosure is required.)
Fortunately, it may be possible to construe DR 4-101(C)(2) to
avoid these problems. Such an interpretation would limit the appli-
cability of this Disciplinary Rule to situations in which a preexisting,
specifically directed court order or legal obligation mandates disclosure.
For example, when a defendant in a criminal case is admitted to bail,
"he is not only regarded as in the custody of his bail, but he is also
in the custody of the law, and admission to bail does not deprive the
court of its inherent power to deal with the person of the prisoner."110
A defendant who jumps bail is guilty of an escape, which is a separate
offense for which he may be punished.11' Suppose, now, that a client
has jumped bail, and subsequently informs his attorney of his where-
abouts. Failure to disclose the client's whereabouts under these cir-
cumstances would aid the client in escaping trial on the crime for
which he was indicted, but would likewise aid him in evading prose-
cution for the additional offense of bail jumping. When this situation
was presented to the American Bar Association Committee on Profes-
sional Responsibility, it was their opinion that "under such circum-
stances the attorney's knowledge of his client's whereabouts is not
privileged, and that he may be disciplined for failing to disclose that
information to the proper authorities .... ,1112 A pre-existing, speci-
fically directed legal requirement (that this defendant show up for trial)
permitted the attorney to disclose information required for its fulfill-
ment. This concept can be extended to situations in which can be
implied an agreement by the client to abide by the terms of a con-
templated court order or legal requirement.
When an attorney representing a defendant in a criminal case applies
on his behalf for probation or suspension of sentence, he represents
to the court, by implication at least, that his client will abide by the
terms and conditions of the court's order. When that attorney is later
advised of a violation of that order, it is his duty to advise his client of
110. Formal Opinion 155 (1936).
111. In New York, bail jumping is either a class A misdemeanor or a class E
felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 205.35, 205.40 (McKinney 1970).
112. Formal Opinion 155 (1936).
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the consequences of his act, and endeavor to prevent a continuance of
the wrongdoing. If his client thereafter persists in violating the terms
and conditions of his probation, it is the duty of the attorney as an
officer of the court to advise the proper authorities concerning his
client's conduct. Such information, even though coming to the attor-
ney from the client in the course of his professional relations with
respect to other matters in which he represents the defendant, is not
privileged from disclosure. 113
From the conclusion that many exercises of the rights of con-
fidentiality involve behavior otherwise unlawful, it does not follow
that any unlawful behavior may be shielded by confidentiality: no
one would suggest, for example, that an attorney should be allowed
113. Formal Opinion 156 (1936) (emphasis added). But see DR 7-102(B)(1):
"A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: His client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetuated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall
promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable
to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the
information is protected as a privileged communication." (emphasis supplied). The itali-
cized portion is an amendment introduced into the Code in 1974. As of this writing, it
has not been adopted in New York. The New York State Bar Association, Special Com-
mittee to Review the Code of Professional Responsibility, released a Report on April 8,
1975 [hereinafter cited as April Report], one portion of which reads, in part, as follows:
We do not believe that the language added by the American Bar Association
satisfactorily resolved the conflict between the lawyer's obligation not to permit
himself to be used by a client to help the client perpetuate a fraud upon either
a person or tribunal. We believe that his obligation should be the same whether
the information regarding the fraud comes from the client, and would be
covered by the attorney-client privilege, or comes from some other source in
the course of professional employment by the client, and thus would be a
"secret" under DR 4-101 (A) ....
In our view, a lawyer who becomes aware of a fraud committed by his
client in the course of the lawyer's representation of the client should be re-
quired to call upon his client to rectify the fraud, if the fraud relates to the
subject matter of the lawyer's representation. If, however, the client refuses
or is unable to rectify the fraud, we believe that withdrawal from representa-
tion should be mandatory. . . . We believe that to require disclosure of the
client's fraud, absent a legal requirement or a court order compelling such
disclosure, would tend to undermine the willingness of clients to seek timely legal
advice. Rectification of fraud damage is, we believe, far more likely to result
where such advice is sought . . . . [W]e also favor broadening the clause to
cover not only past frauds . . . but also continuing or intended frauds.
Id. at 6-7. The Committee goes on to say that:
[t]he term 'fraud' is, we believe, and should be, limited to conduct which in-
volves an element of scienter, deceit, or an intent to mislead. The fact that
certain other conduct may be characterized as 'fraudulent' by statute or admin-
istrative rule would not necessarily be determinative of the lawyer's obligations
under the Code.
rd. at 8-9. The rule is stated in the permissive, as indicated by its use of the word
"may." The interpretation suggested in the test, in connection with Formal Opinions 155
and 136, intimates the possibility that in its limited application the rule mandates dis-
closure. However, as indicated by the body of controversy surrounding this aspect of
the rule, the point is still open. See April Report, supra, at 4-5.
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to commit homicide as a part of his advocacy. Of course, it is difficult
to conceive of a situation in which such an act would be a direct
consequence of the preservation of a client's secrets. This distinguishes
the situation from that faced by Mr. Armani and Mr. Belge. Their
otherwise unlawful act was the failure to report the whereabouts of two
cadavers. One theory under which they may be exempted from the
legal consequences of such behavior is that the very information which
the statute required to be revealed was communicated to them in
confidence by their client. Thus, they could not comply with the statu-
tory duties without violating the confidentiality of the lawyer-client
relationship. Another, better, theory involves an examination of the
social policies and values which attach to otherwise unlawful behavior
sought to be protected by confidentiality: one reason why murder
cannot be condoned as a function of advocacy is that the sanctity of
life far outweighs any conceivable social benefit gained by its extinction.
A final iesolution of the problems posed by the actions of Mr. Armani
and Mr. Belge ultimately depends on the outcome of a balancing of
the social values of their alternatives. 14
The social interest attaching to burial of the dead should not be
underestimated.
Civilization from the earliest days has provided for the burial of
the dead. History deals with the tombs of the antidiluvian worthies,
Abel, Seth, Noah, and Ham. Sheikh Mohammed grew rich by repre-
senting to the passing public the tomb of an ass as that of a noted
saint. Even animals have recognized the beneficence of such a custom.
It is recorded that when Paul the Hermit died, two lions issued from
the desert to dig his grave, uttered a long howl of mourning over his
body and then departed.
The general tendency of mankind has always been to bury the dead
out of the sight of the living. Amongst the ancients an unburied body
was held to be disgraced and the spirit was unhappy until a kindly
stranger, at least, threw a few handfuls [sic] of earth on the corpse.
Long before the Pilgrim Fathers began to worry, work, freeze and
sweat upon our shores, the common law of England gave to every
person the right to be buried in his parish church yard .... In the
United States, neglect to bury a dead body by any one whose duty it is
to bury it, and having sufficient means to do so, is a misdemeanor.115
114. "The recognition of a privilege does not mean that it is without conditions
or exceptions. The social policy that will prevail in many situations may run afoul in
others of a different social policy, competing for supremacy." Clark v. United States,
289 U.S. 1, 13 (1932).
115. In re Tierney, 88 Misc. 347, 349, 151 N.Y.S. 972, 974 (Sur. Ct. 1914). Sea
also Patterson v. Patterson, 59 N.Y. 574 (1875); Cercelli v. Wein, 60 Misc. 2d 345,
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The acute sensitivity of the courts in New York to any interference
with the rights of survivors with respect to the body of a decedent
is illustrated by this statement from Gratton v. Baldwinsville Acad-
emy:"06 "Even assuming . . . that the plaintiff's mother was deprived
of the right to view her child for some three or four minutes, brief
though the period of deprivation may have been, while the power to
do so was in the hands of the school board authorities... it still would
be sufficient for a court to grant damages for such denial."11 7 And in
People v. Ackley, 1" 8 the appellate division affirmed a judgment of con-
viction for a violation of former Penal Law, section 2211, stating that
"[d]efendant... was found guilty of acts that would grieve and shock
relatives and outrage the public in failing to inter several corpses
entrusted to him for burial." " 9
On the other hand are the rules and theories of lawyer-client con-
fidentiality, with their strengths and weaknesses. In New York, as in
most other jurisdictions, it is the policy to assume that factual infor-
mation communicated by or through a client to his attorney is pro-
tected by the rules of confidentiality. 20 Indeed, a communication
should be regarded as confidential where it possibly is So. 12 1 The
presumption of confidentiality indicates that confidentiality is con-
sidered an important and integral part of our legal system, and that
confidences may be revealed only in very extreme situations. For
example, while it is normally the duty of an attorney to disclose perjury
which has been committed, he cannot make the disclosure if the perjury
is committed by his client, and he learns of it by means of a confidential
communication from his client. 22 Perjury is a serious offense, and
perpetrates fraud on a court, which an attorney is specifically bound to
303 N.Y.S. 316 (Civ. Ct. 1969); Weingast v. State, 44 Misc. 2d 824, 254 N.Y.S.2d 952,
(Ct. Cl. 1964).
116. 49 Misc. 2d 329, 330 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
117. Id.
118. 270 App. Div. 958, 62 N.Y.S.2d 771 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 731,
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 846 (1946).
119. Id. at 958, 62 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
120. Ford Motor Co. v. 0. W. Burke Co., 59 Misc. 2d 543, 546, 299 N.Y.S.2d
946, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1969); accord, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F.
Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1960).
121. See MICHIGAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL REsPONsI-
BILiTY, Opinion 118; ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, Opinion 308. [Copies of these opinions are available from the re-
spective Bar Associations.]
122. Formal Opinion 287 (1953); Informal Opinion C-778 (1964). It was fur-
ther held that the lawyer should insist that his client confess; if the client refuses to do
so, the lawyer should attempt to withdraw from the case.
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prevent. 123 Yet, if an attorney learns on the basis of confidential in-
formation, that a client has perjured (or is perjuring) himself, his
ethical duty is deliberately to ignore the requirements of law in favor
of the preservation of the confidences. Even admitting that the right
to burial is fundamental to society, it hardly seems reasonable to expect
an attorney to violate a client's confidence to secure it.
Moreover, it is to their credit that Mr. Armani and Mr. Beige
sought and received a waiver of confidentiality from their client, and
then did reveal the locations of the other victims. Only the client may
waive his right to confidentiality, 124 and until a waiver has occurred,
the duty against disclosure is absolute. 125 Garrow did not waive con-
fidentiality until he testified in open court to his involvement in the
slayings of the two women. 26 Almost immediately thereafter, Mr.
Armani and Mr. Belge revealed the locations of the bodies to author-
ities. Consequently, if the information retained by the lawyers was
protected under the duty of non-disclosure of confidential information,
then the attorneys were prohibited by their professional responsibilities
from revealing the information until its confidentiality had been
waived by their client, and this is exactly what happened.
In addition, the theory of confidentiality is bolstered by several
123. Former Canon 41. See also Former Canons 29, 32, 16, 15; N.Y. PUNAL LAw
§§ 210.00-210.50 (McKinney 1970) (perjury).
124. Lanza v. Joint Legislative Comm., 3 N.Y.2d 92, 143 N.E.2d 772, 164 N.Y.S.2d
9, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957); Beach v. Oil Transfer, 23 Misc. 2d 47, 100
N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Mileski v. Locker, 14 Misc. 2d 252, 178 N.Y.S.2d 911
(Sup. Ct. 1958) ; Castiglione v. State, 8 Misc. 2d 932, 169 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
125. Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Fox v.
44 Cigar Co., 90 N.J. 483, 101 A. 184 (1917); Yorden v. Hess, 13 Johns. 492 (Sup. Ct.
1816).
126. A client's own testimony on direct examination is equivalent to a waiver.
People v. Patrick, 182 N.Y. 131, 175, 74 N.E. 843, 857 (1905). Garrow's defense was
insanity. As a matter of trial strategy, Garrow's attorneys elicited from him what
amounted to confessions to the slayings of two other women. The following excerpts from
the trial transcripts exemplify the events at the trial on June 17, 1974:
Q: (By Beige): Do you remember ... how she died?
A: (By Garrow): Yes . .. she was strangled with a rope .... I think I told
you it was a rope or something like a.,wire that I picked up ....
Q: [D]id you leave the body right there?
A: Yes. Yes, I did.
Record at 16.
A: [T]hat is after that girl, you know, I pushed her down the mineshaft ....
Record at 29.
There is no question but that Garrow, himself, understood that his communications
with his lawyers were protected by the lawyer-client relationship. The New York Times
reported that Mr. Beige had advised Garrow that "I could not reveal the information
unless I got his permission." N.Y. Times, June 20, 1974 i at 1, col. 2. The Schenectady
Gazette reported that until their disclosure on June 19, neither Mr. Armani nor Mr.
Beige had ever told authorities that they had found a body or bodies. Schenectady
Gazette, June 21, 1974, at 34, col. 5.
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interpretations of provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
In a criminal proceeding, the duty of a defense counsel not to disclose
facts confidentially received, stems partly from the presumption of
innocence which follows the accused throughout his trial. Under no
circumstances does the attorney have an obligation to assist in the
preparation of his adversary's case. The burden of proof is solely on
the prosecutor, the accused having an absolute right to remain silent.127
The thrust of the fifth amendment 28 is that "prosecutors are forced
to search for independent evidence instead of relying upon proof
exacted from individuals by force."'129 The sixth amendment 30 guaran-
tees that a defendant in a criminal action "need not stand alone against
the state at any stage,"' 3' and has been interpreted to guarantee to an
accused the assistance of counsel both in and out of court. 32 Taken
together, these constitutional provisions work in conjunction with the
rules of confidentiality. If a client consults counsel in confidence, his
fifth amendment right against" self-incrimination would be futile were
the attorney to testify to incriminating confidential information13s
127. Escobedo v. Illinois, 379 U.S. 478 (1964); see Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
The state obviously cannot impose a self-reporting statute upon the criminal himself.
Not only is such a statute impractical, but the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment is an impenetrable barrier to such a plan. Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1967). Clearly, Garrow's in-
volvement in the deaths of Ms. Hauck and Ms. Petz precluded any possibility of punish-
ing him for not reporting those deaths.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides in part: "No person... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "
129. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1943). Another reason for the
existence of the privilege against self-incrimination is said to be that coerced evidence is
unreliable. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
131. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
132. Id.; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); see Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 379 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
133. The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination has been thought of as
personal to the defendant, and hence the question arises whether it may be asserted
vicariously by the attorney. The paradigmatic situation would be one in which no ethical
duty against disclosure exists, but a communication is protected to safeguard an ac-
cused's right against self-incrimination. In United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1963), a subpoena duces tecum demanded the production of bank statements and
checks. Such items, because of their negotiability, were held not protected by lawyer-
client privilege. However, they were held to be protected by the client's right against
self-incrimination. The court saw no objection to the fact that the defendants' fifth
amendment rights had been raised on their behalf by their attorney, stating that the
issue wts
the effective exercise of the [fifth amendment] privilege by one who is clearly en-
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And effective assistance of counsel requires that a client be willing to
confide in his attorney, and he will not do this unless he is assured that
his communications will be held in confidence. 134 Had Mr. Armani
and Mr. Belge prematurely divulged the information received by them
in confidence from Garrow, they in fact would have negated their
client's constitutional guarantees under the fifth and sixth amend-
ments.135
Lawyers are a necessary part of our legal system. Few who have
not been trained in law could hope to cope with our complicated
system of justice. In criminal actions, the state has armies of experts,
and other resources, upon which to call for the preparation and pres-
entation of the best case possible against an individual accused of a
crime. The state can generally present its case in the best possible way;
that is, the presentation of the state's case is accomplished by the par-
tisan advocacy of skilled attorneys. Against the amassed resources and
expertise of the state stands an individual accused of a crime, who faces
the very real possibilities of the most severe formal punishments im-
posed by our society. Because he lives in a system of law, the individual
has the right to defend himself against the charges brought against
him. But because he is generally not a lawyer, this right would be
illusory were an individual required to defend himself without assist-
ance against the expertise of his opponent, the state. Therefore, we
require that the state prove its charges "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
according to the law, and within the boundaries of strict safeguards for
individual defendants. One of the most important of these safeguards
titled to it. We are called upon only to consider the method whereby the privi-
lege-holder makes known his desire to assert the privilege ....
Id. at 463; see Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1912); Schwinmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); In re House,
144 F. Supp. 95, 100 (N.D. Cal. 1956). See also Maness v. Meyers, 95 S. Ct. 584 (1975).
134. The court in Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 760 (D.D.C.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1951), relied in part on the sixth amendment to hold that a
defendant was entitled to be protected against "surreptitious interception of her tele-
phone conversations with her counsel." See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942); United States v. Venuto, 182 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1950).
135. See generally Maness v. Meyers, 95 S. Ct. 584 (1975), in which it was
sought to hold a lawyer in contempt for his refusal to reveal certain confidential in-
formation acquired from his client, and for advising his client to plead his fifth amend-
ment rights against self-incrimination:
This court has always broadly construed its protection to assure that an indi-
vidual is not compelled to produce evidence which later may be used against
him as an accused in a criminal action .... The protection does not merely
encompass evidence which may lead to criminal conviction, but includes in-
formation which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence that could lead
to a prosecution, as well as evidence which an individual reasonably believes




is the right of an individual who is accused of a crime to be assisted by
counsel. The right to counsel is not a sham. An attorney is partisan;
he is, to a large extent, a "hired gun" who devotes his skills as a lawyer
to the presentation of his client's case in the most favorable light-
just as his opponents do for their client, the state.
The adversary process of law has been devised and developed as
the best method for the orderly administration of justice, for the fairest
ordering of the legal relationships of individuals within our society.
Lawyer-client confidentiality may be abused. If it is, the adversary
system fails in its primary quest, the attainment of justice. Fortunately,
such abuse is rare, though perhaps inevitable. Guilty parties have gone
free, and innocent parties have undoubtedly been convicted because
the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship has been improperly
manipulated. So long, however, as such abuse remains only infrequent,
and the high ethical standards of the legal profession are maintained,
it may be that occasional and individual distortions of the adversary
process are tolerable as a price we must pay for the complexity of our
legal system. For it may be that the existence of lawyer-client confi-
dentiality is necessary if our legal system is to continue to be viable
at all.
Max Lerner has noted that Mr. Armani and Mr. Belge "were not
motivated by self-interest, or any fat fee."'136 They were silent "out
of a belief that the confidential lawyer-client relation is at the heart
of their job .... Otherwise how can a client-especially a wretched
one-place any trust in the man he picks or who is picked to defend
him?" While it happened that their silence had a "gruesome result,"
"[o]n balance, the trust achieved through silence weighs heavily on
the scales of social interest-more heavily even than a parent's needless
heartbreak."' 37
POSTSCRIPT
On February 13, 1975, Francis R. Belge was indicted by an
Onondaga County Grand Jury, accusing him of violating section
4200(1) and section 4143 of the New York Public Health Law. 38 On
August 1, 1975, in an eight-page decision, Onondaga County Judge
Ormand N. Gale dismissed the indictment. 3 9
136. New York Post, June 24, 1974, at 33, col. 4.
137. Id.
138. People v. Beige, Indictment No. 75-55, Index No. 75/123 (Onondaga
County Ct., Feb. 13, 1975).
139. Id. (Onondaga County Ct., filed Aug. 1, 1975).
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In his opinion, Judge Gale "weigh[ed] the importance of the
general privilege of confidentiality ... against the inroads of such a
privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. ."140 He
stated:
The effectiveness of counsel is only as great as the confidentiality
of its client-attorney relationship. If the lawyer cannot get all the
facts about the case, he can only give his client half of a defense.
This, of necessity, involves the client telling his attorney everything
remotely connected with the crime.
Apparently, in the instant case, after analyzing all the evidence,
and after hearing of the bizzare episodes in the life of their client,
they [Mr. Armani and Mr. Beige] decided that the only possibility
of salvation was in a defense of insanity. For the client to disclose
not only everything about this particular crime but also everything
about other crimes which might have a bearing upon his defense,
requires the strictest confidence in, and on the part of, the attorney.14'
As against the "trivia of a pseudo-criminal statute" 142 attorney-
client confidentiality must prevail. The grand jury, said Judge Gale,
was "grasping at straws."'1 43
Also pertinent is a new opinion from the New York State Bar
Association Committee on Professional Ethics.14 4 The Committee ruled
that that it would be improper for a lawyer representing a client who is
140. Id. at 7.
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id. at 7.
143. Id. at 8. Also encouraging is the decision by Hamilton County Judge George
W. Marthen. In re Armani & Belge (Hamilton County Ct., filed July 3, 1975). In
granting additional compensation, Judge Marthen said:
The Court is not hesitant to point out that counsel for the Defendant
[Garrow] devoted extraordinary energy and talent to the defense in this case.
The disclosure upon trial that the Defendant admitted to his counsel, in an
early stage of their representation, that he had committed three other murders
and could direct them to the locations of the bodies of two of his victims,
whose deaths had not theretofore been confirmed, rocked not only the news
media but the foundation of our system of criminal justice. Who can imagine
the anguish of these attorneys, fathers themselves, at having to carry inviolate
this confidence knowing full well the agonies endured by the parents of the
missing girls? Who can appreciate the torment, after the disclosure was made
public, suffered by them as a result of the poisoned pens and poisoned tongues
of the self-righteous? Who, indeed, in the legal profession can truly and ob-
jectively look back from the comfortable chair of the Monday morning quarter-
back and say, 'I would have done thus and so in spite of the ethic of confi-
dentiality which I am sworn to uphold.'? Indeed, who can understand the
anguish of having to defend oneself months later against charges of criminal
wrongdoing where one has acted in the highest tradition of the legal profession?
Id. at 5-6.
144. New York State Bar Asssociation Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion
# 405 (August 15, 1975).
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charged with the crime of larceny to divulge to the authorities confiden-
tial information obtained from the client as to the location of the
stolen propery. The Committee said:
DR 4-101 (C) (3) appears to be applicable to the confidential
disclosure made by the client to his lawyer of the location of the
stolen property since it reveals the commission of a crime that is con-
tinuing. It may be fairly assumed that such confidential disclosure im-
plicitly expresses the client's intention to continue committing the
crime. However, this provision is permissive and not mandatory.
Accordingly, the answer to the question is that the attorney has no
affirmative obligation to reveal to the authorities the location of the
stolen property.
But the important question that arises is whether it would be a
proper exercise of discretion for the lawyer to reveal to the authorities
the location of the stolen property. Under the circumstances, it would
be improper for the attorney to disclose this confidential information
without the consent of his client.
Inherent in the disclosure of this confidence of the client is the
serious risk of exposing the client as the possessor of the stolen
property. In this connection, it should be noted that the act of con-
cealment when committed by the thief, though a separate crime, is
normally incident to the crime of larceny. It is this reality that has
permitted the inference to be drawn from the unexplained recent
and exclusive possession of stolen property that the possessor stole
the property. Evidence of the concealment, therefore, would be evi-
dence of the larceny.
Should the attorney reveal the location of the stolen property,
he would, in effect, be assuming a role adverse to the interests of his
client and repugnant to the confidential relationship between lawyer
and client. In essence, he would be disclosing confidential information
as to the crime of larceny that is charged against his client. In other
words, he would be doing indirectly what he could not do directly
as a matter of law, as well as ethical obligation.145
JEFFREY FANK CHAMBERLAIN
145. Id. at 2-3.

